Jerry Marcellin v. Delbert Osguthorpe : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1958
Jerry Marcellin v. Delbert Osguthorpe : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Skeen, Worsley, Snow & Christensen; Harold G. Christensen; Attorneys for Appellant and
Defendant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Marcellin v. Osguthorpe, No. 8944 (Utah Supreme Court, 1958).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3181
.. ,.,;. I l I U 1/"\.n 
FEb l G 1959 
LA 'vV. LhiRAR'G 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
!L 
JERRY MARCELLIN, n c·; 3 11958 
D 
Respondent and Plaintiff,~- -----Cj;;k:--s~;;;~-~-~--c~~;t;··ut;h···~ 
-vs.-
DELBERT OSGUTHORPE, 
Appellant and Defendant. 
Case No. 8944 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
and HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant and Defendant 
701 Continental B:ank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE ,S,UPREME COURT 
of the 
STAT.E OF UTAH 
JERRY MARCELLIN, 
Respondent and Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
DELBERT OSGUTHORPE, 
Appellant and Defendant. 
Case No. 8944 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal frmn a judgment for $860.00 en-
tered August 7, 1958, in favor of Jerry Marcellin, Re-
spondent and Plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as Plain-
tiff, against Delbert Osguthorpe, Appellant and Defend-
ant, hereinafter referred to as Defendant. The case arose 
out of an automobile accident occurring November 17, 
1957, in Summit 'County, Utah. The judgment represents 
damage to Plaintiff's automobile. 
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2 
On the morning of the accident Plaintiff left his home 
at Park City, Utah, for work at Chicago Bridge & Iron 
Works, Salt Lake City, Utah, at his customary time-
between ten and five minutes before 6:00 A.M. (T. 3. 
References are to transcript and record, since the two 
are separate.) Plaintiff was driving a 1954 Chevrolet 
automobile in good working condition, equipped with new 
snow tires. It was dark. The road had an inch or two of 
new snow over ice; it was "very slick". (T. 4, 28, 47). 
After leaving Park City, Plaintiff traveled north 
along U.S. Alternate Highway 40 to a point west of 
Snyderville, Utah, where the highway curves, turned 
left at the curve and proceeded \vest, downgrade, at 35 
to 40 miles per hour. He saw the headlights of another 
vehicle about 1,000 feet straight ahead in the lane for on-
coming cars. They were on high beam. ( T. 5, 6). 
When 500 to 600 feet from the vehicle ahead, Plain-
tiff began blinking his lights. vVhen 200 to 250 feet away, 
he concluded that the other vehicle was not going to dim 
its lights and eased off the accelerator, reducing his 
speed, possibly five miles per hour, but nevertheless con-
tinued until his headlights disclosed the red taillights of a 
Cadillac automobile 50 to 60 feet away stopped on a 
northwesterly angle blocking his lane of traffic. (T. 7, 8). 
Defendant, 1neanwhile, had driven a pick-up truck 
from his dair~T fann located on the south side of the high-
way onto the higlnnt~T, turned right and proceeded east 
when observed the Cadillac autonwbile apparently dis-
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abled (T. 62). He stopped even with the Cadillac to see 
if he could be of assistance. At this time he observed the 
headlights of Plaintiff's automobile approaching at a 
high rate of speed (T. 69). Defendant started backing 
toward the shoulder and to the west and had backed 27 
feet when Plaintiff's automobile richocheted from the 
rear bumper of the Cadillac into the front fender of the 
truck, the left side of which was 4 to 5 feet from the center 
of the highway, and continued through snow banks on 
the side of the road for a distance of 216 feet (T. 49, 57, 
59). Defendant's truck was moved 2 or 3 feet by the int--
pact (T. 30). The highway at the scene of the accident 
was 19 or 20 feet wide (T. 5). 
Plaintiff admitted that his headlights would disclose 
objects 250 feet away, that he saw the Cadillac automo-
bile as soon as his headlights fell upon it, but that he was 
unable to stop because he was going too fast. (T. 27, 32). 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court, over 
objection of the Defendant, submitted the case to the jury 
upon a special verdict containing the doctrine of Last 
Clear Chance, in addition to the issues of negligence, 
contributory negligence and proximate cause. In this 
connection, the jury was instructed : 
"Under certain circumstances a plaintiff is en-
titled to judgment against a defendant even though 
the plaintiff be guilty of contributory negligence. 
This rule of law that thus permits a negligent 
plaintiff to recover judg1nent is known as the 
doctrine of last clear chance. If you determine 
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that the plaintiff was in fact guilty of contributory 
negligence, you should then consider whether or 
not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable 
to this case. The doctrine is applicable if and only 
if you find from a preponderence of the evidence 
that each of the following five propositions is true: 
1. That the plaintiff was in a position of 
danger from which he was unable to free himself 
by the exercise of due care. 
2. That the defendant either discovered the 
plaintiff in his helpless position of danger, or by 
exercising due care would have discovered him. 
3. That the defendant, after thus discovering 
the plaintiff, or after he thus should have discover-
ed him had he exercised due care, then realized, 
or by exercising due care should have realized th~~ 
danger to the plaintiff. 
4. That at the time the defendant thus either 
discovered the plaintiff or should have discovered 
him, and after he thus realized or should have 
realized the plaintiff's helpless position of danger, 
he then had a clear opportunity to avoid the acci-
dent by the exercise of ordinary care and ''ith 
his then existing abilit~~. There 1nust have been an 
actual opportunity existing at that 11101nent for 
the defendant to avoid the accident. Also. it n1ust 
have been a fair, clear opportunity and not just 
a bare possibility of doing so. 
5. That the defendant then negligently failed 
to avail hin1self of that clear opportunity and as a 
proximate r0~nlt, the plaintiff \YH$ injured. 
If ~·ou find that each of the above five propo-
8itions is tnw, the doctrine of last clear chance 
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is applicable to this case, and the plaintiff is en-
titled to a verdict in his favor even though you 
find him guilty of contributory negligence. If you 
find that any one of the above five proposition~ 
is not true, the doctrine of last clear chance has 
no application and cannot be invoked by the plain-
tiff." 
The jury found the Defendant guilty of violating the 
statute relative to dimming headlights, 41-6-135, U.C.A., 
1953, and that this violation was a proximate cause of the 
collision (R. 7 4). The jury also found: "The Plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent in travelling too fast for exist-
ing conditions," but that: "The Defendant had the last 
clear chance as defined in the instructions to avoid the 
collision" (R. 75, 76). 
After the verdict had been received, both Plaintiff 
and Defendant moved for judgment in their favor upon 
the verdict (R. 79). Plainitff's motion was granted and 
Defendant's motion denied (R. 92). Judgment was there-
upon entered for the Plaintiff and against the Defendant, 
from which this appeal was taken. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH, 
ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR 
CHANCE TO THE JURY IN THIS CASE. 
II 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY ERRED 
IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
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UPON THE SPECIAL VERDICT AND IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT UPON 
THE SPECIAL VERDICT. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH, 
ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR 
CHAN.CE TO THE JURY IN THIS CASE. 
The doctrine of Last Clear Chance as it applied in 
Utah is based largely upon proximate cause. If plaintiff's 
negligence continues up to the time of the injury and is 
a proximate cause thereof, Last Clear Chance is not 
applicable. This Court has firmly established this propo-
sition and has repeatedly held that in cases where the 
plaintiff's negligence continues, Last Clear Chance is not 
to be considered but rather the usual rules of contributory 
negligence apply and if found defeat the plaintiff's claim. 
In Compton et al. v. Ogden Union Railzcay and Depot 
Company, (Utah, 1951), 235 P. 2d 515, the plaintiff, w·hile 
walking along a well defined pathway running parallel to 
the defendant's railroad tracks, ·was struck by a diesel 
engine operated by the defendant in its yard at Ogden, 
Utah. The Court said : 
". . . When the injured person's negligence 
has not emue to rest so that by the exercise of 
reasonable care she "\Yould have been able to aYoid 
the peril at any tilne up to the nwrnent of injury, 
the injnr)· is then the result of the concurring 
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negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant. The 
one was just as nmch the proxirnate cause as tho 
other." 
See also Holmgren v. Uni'on Pacific R. Co., (Utah, 
1948), 198 P.2d 459, where the court pointed out that in 
Last Clear Chance cases the plaintiff's negligence has 
become in a sense fixed and realizable and on to this state 
of things the defendant approaches onto the negligent 
plaimt~ff with and in control of the danger. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In this case the jury has found that the negligence 
of Plaintiff was a concurring cause of the accident. This 
negligence consisted of failing to drive at a reasonable 
speed in view of the width, surface and condition of the 
highway, the traffic thereon, the visibility and the actual 
and potential hazards then existing (Instruction 9-E). In 
its very nature, this negligence continued until the mo-
ment of the accident. 
Even if it be assurned, however, that Plaintiff's negli-
gence came to rest or became fixed, what opportunity did 
Defendant have to avoid the accident~ Plaintiff argues 
that Defendant could have dimmed his lights and this 
accident thereby avoided. 
This obviously would have required that Plaintiff 
guide his car like a sled between the Cadillac and the truck 
along a "weaving" course. Last Clear Chance, however, 
conten1plates that Defendant, not Plaintiff, have the 
clear chance. 
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This is well stated in Graham v. J ohnson7 et al.7 
(Utah, 1946), 166 P.2d 230, where the court said: 
"The liability of the defendant arose because 
he failed to take the opportunity which he alone 
had timely to avoid doing the plaintiff harm even 
though the plaintiff was negligent in getting hinl-
self in a position where he was helpless or because 
he was so inattentive that he was not alert to the 
approaching danger over which defendant had 
control." (Emphasis added.) 
* * * 
"One should not be held liable for failing to 
avoid the effect of the other's negligence in a 
situation where it is speculative as to whether he 
was afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it. In 
a situation where both parties are on the 1nove 
the significance of the word 'clear' is most im-
portant. Otherwise we may put the onus of avoid-
ing the effect of one's negligence on a party not 
negligent. That party's negligence only arise.:~ 
when it is definitely established that there was 
ample time and opportunity to avoid the accident 
which was not taken advantage of." 
Last Clear Chance cannot be applied on a sho-wing 
that Defendant may have had a chance to avoid the acci-
dent. "Defendant n1ust have had the last chance and also 
had a clear chance." Holmgren v. Union Pacific R. Co._, 
supra. As the court observed in that case that he should 
have had the last chance implies that his chance to avoid 
the accident 1nust have cmne later in point of time than 
any similar ehance on the part of the injured person. 
That he should have had a clear chance iinplies that he 
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must have had nwre than a bare possible chance to avoid 
an unexpected peril created practically siinultaneously 
with the happening of the accident by the negligence of 
the injured party. 
In spite of this well settled principle, Plaintiff asks 
that this Court now hold that it is sufficient for appli-
cation of Last Clear Chance that Plaintiff be able to avoid 
the accident but for the negligence of Defendant. 
Even if so, how could Plaintiff have avoided the acci-
dent if he was in a position of inextricable peril as he 
Inust be to invoke the doctrine in the first instance o? 
It is a contradiction in tenns to say while Plaintiff 
could not extricate himself from the roller coaster ride 
upon which he had embarked, nevertheless, he could have 
at once freed himself had Defendant's lights been dimmed. 
The "dimming" cases are governed by principles of 
primary negligence and contributory negligence and 
where a blinded plaintiff has been found negligent, such 
negligence has been held a concurring cause of the acci-
dent. See "Duties and Liabilities of Vehicle Driver Blind-
ed by the Glare of Lights," 22 A.L.R. (2d) 292 and "Glar-
ing Headlights as Cause of Collisions," 9 N.C.C.A. (3rd) 
190. 
The doctrine of Last Clear Chance is a limitation up-
on the defense of contributory negligence and should not 
be extended further in its application than it can be sup-
ported by cogent reasoning. Anderson v. Bingham Indus-
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trial Railroad Company (Utah, 1950), 214 P.2d 607. This 
Court has repeatedly held that Last Clear Chance has 
limited application to cases involving moving vehicles. 
Hickok v. Skinner, (Utah, 1948), 190 P.2d 514; Beckstrom 
v. Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210, 282 P.2d 309 (1955). Also, 
in this case Defendant was moving away from Plaintiff. 
It would, indeed, make more sense to apply the doctrine 
against Plaintiff than in his favor. 
II 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY ERRED 
IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
UPON THE SPECIAL VERDICT AND IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT UPON 
THE SPECIAL VERDICT. 
Since the doctrine of Last Clear Chance can have no 
proper application to this case, the finding of the jury 
that the Plaintiff was "contributorily negligent," defined 
in Instruction 9-a as negligence on the part of a person 
injured which cooperating with the negligence of another, 
assists in proxin1ately causing his own injury, it must 
follow that Defendant's motion for judgment, no cause of 
action, upon the verdict should have been granted. 
CONCLUSION 
If the doctrine of Last Clear Chance be dee1ned ap-
plicable to the facts of this case, then the defense of con-
tributory negligence is mnasculated. 
The jury in this case found contributory negligence 
in driving too fast for existing conditions, which, in its 
very nature, continued to the Ino1nent of the accident. 
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Since Last Clear Chance can have no proper application 
under such facts, the District Court of Summit County 
should have entered judgment for the Defendant, no cause 
of action, upon the Defendant's motion following return 
of the special verdict. The District Court's error in fail-
ing so to do should now be corrected by this Court by 
reversal of the judgment on the special verdict with in-
structions to the clerk of the court to enter judgment for 
the Defendant and against the Plaintiff, no cause of ac-
tion. 
Respectfully subrnitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
and HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant and Defendant 
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